4 August 2001. Thanks to Anonymous.

See also two related papers:

Military Applications of Information Warfare by PRC, by Lt. General Abe C. Lin.

http://www.dsis.org.tw/pubs/seminars/2000-02-19/s_ciw00-0219-003e.pdf (13 pp., 38KB)

The PRC's Research on Information Warfare, Its Influence over the ROC and the ROC's Counter-measures, by Tseng, Jang-ruey

http://www.dsis.org.tw/pubs/seminars/2000-02-19/s_ciw00-0219-004e.pdf (26 pp., 81KB)

3 August 2001. Thanks to Anonymous.
Source: http://www.dsis.org.tw/pubs/seminars/s_tp00-01-003.pdf (25KB)

[9 pages; undated, original file is dated 27 December 2000.]

COMPARISON OF THE INFORMATION WARFARE
CAPABILITIES OF THE ROC AND PRC

Gen. Abe C. Lin
Director
Communication Electronics & Information Bureau

ABSTRACT

There is a close correlation between the combat activities and social development. From agriculture, to industry, then to an information society, countries are studying innovative ways to try to gain an advantage by changing how wars are fought. The information society brings new revolutionary technologies, which demand change in the way wars are fought. This poses serious concerns for advanced countries that heavily rely on the information in their war fighting processes. The Republic of China (ROC) is viewed as an “information country” and is getting more dependent on information. The terrifying experience of “The July 29 Power Outage” and “The September 21 Earthquake” are still vivid in the minds of the ROC society. It raises a concern as to whether the ROC could defend itself from various types of information warfare attack from the PRC. This is a priority and the focus of ROC military combat readiness.

I. PREFACE

In January 1998, Lt. General Patrick Hughes, Director of the U.S. DOD Defense Intelligence Agency, stated the following in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing: “Military strategists with technology and creativity are leading the development and application of new ways of war fighting. New and innovative ways are changing the traditional ways of war fighting. The superior position of the U.S. military and its determination in keeping its leadership role of the world cause our enemies to seek alternate ways to attack the U.S.” General John Shalikashvili, Former Chairman of JCS, in an article titled “Military Strategy of the Nation”, described “information warfare” as the largest “asymmetric warfare” concern of the U.S.¹. A hacker or a country could attack the U.S. using information warfare techniques and do considerable damage. As the development of the information society continues, all countries of the world have to take the “soundless war” very seriously.

II. ORIGIN OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Because information warfare is a new type of war fighting, there is no authoritative definition of the terminology “information warfare”. Dr. Thomas P. Rona first used the term of “information war” in a report delivered to Boeing Company, titled “Weapon Systems and Information War” in 1976. Dr. Rona pointed out that the information infrastructure was becoming a key component of the U.S. economy. At the same time, it is becoming a vulnerable target in both war and peacetime.² As for the U.S. military, the USAF started to actively discuss this subject in the 1980s. By then, a consensus was reached that “information” could be a target and also used as a weapon.

After years’ of study, in February 1996, the U.S. DOD published “Joint Pub 3-13.1 Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare”. It described command and control warfare as an application of information warfare in military operations. It defines command and control warfare as:³

“The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions.”

In this Joint Publication, it specified the organization, planning, training, exercise, and joint operations of command and control. Most important, this publication specified the doctrine of command and control warfare. This was the first time the U.S. DOD specified the scope and doctrine of information warfare.

In October 1998, U.S. DOD published “Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations”. In the beginning, this Joint Pub was called “Joint Doctrine for Information Warfare”. Later, it was changed to “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations”. The reason of the change was to clarify the relationship of the information operations and information warfare. They were defined, as follows:⁴

Information Operations:

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.

Information Warfare:

Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.

Based on the definition above, the U.S. DOD has a broad definition for information warfare. However, since the “Gulf War”, the definition of the “frontline” of war is no longer clear any more. In the future, information warfare could be engaged in any place. Due to the well-defined function and responsibilities of the U.S. DOD, currently its policy is not to interfere with other organization’s operations. This could open a door for the PRC to gain an advantage over the U.S. military power.

III. CURRENT INFORMATION WARFARE CAPBILITIES OF ROC AND PRC

1. Information Warfare Strategy

In the middle of 1980s, the PRC started to develop its next generation combat power. They paid special attention to the development of information warfare. After the “Gulf War”, the PRC noticed that its traditional military power was far behind that of the U.S. If PRC confronted the U.S. directly, it basically would lose the war. Therefore, the PRC started to look for solutions in the asymmetric warfare. Mr. Shen, Wei-Kuang, PRC military strategist, stated in a dissertation: ”The transitional military power only destroys an enemy’s military assets and economic potential. But offensive information warfare could impact the enemy’s military, political, economic, and social, even psychological foundations. It could destroy the enemy’s information infrastructure and operations. It could paralyze the enemy’s military, banking, communications, electronics, and electrical systems/networks. The use of military deception and psychological operations can destroy an enemy’s faith in its own government. This would deter the enemy’s intent to attack or could neutralize its ability to fight.”⁵

This viewpoint matches that of the book “War on Exceeding the Limits” by Chiao, Lang, and Wang, Chian-Hwei.⁶ Exceeding the Limits means a paradigm shift in thinking first, then the behaviors. The important subject is to select the best method to exceed the limits. Whether it is a hacker, terrorist, or financial instruments, it is not the key. The key is to have the future national or military leader to jump out of the existing framework of thinking. The future national and military leader should look at the damages might cause by the non-military actions taken by the adversary to support its military operations.

2. Information Warfare Tactics

The PRC has made some progress in the development of information warfare tactics and profiles. The offensive information warfare tactic of the PRC is to jam, destroy, damage, and deceive enemy information systems. The tactics include, as directly translated from the Chinese meaning, “Take the Eye Out (destroy the information source)”, “Cut the Path off (cut-off the information pathway)”, “Take the Heart Out (destroy the information processing center)”, and “Disturb the Sleep (Jam the information receiver station)”. The information warfare profiles include “Protect the Eye and Open the Source (protect and enlarge the information source)”, “Protect the Path and Facilitate the Flow (protect information and keep information flow smoothly)”, “Protect the Machine and Guard the Heart (protect the computer security)”, and “Use Multiple Methods and Anti-jamming (use multiple paths to transmit information and enhance anti-jamming capabilities)”. The PRC’s tactics are focused on how to destroy the other party’s man, machine, and information in order to paralyze their combat abilities.⁷

The strategic approach of the ROC military is “Effective Deterrence and Defense”. The operational concept for the information warfare is to prevent the enemy’s use of any method to launch an information warfare attack on the ROC. This is to ensure the national security. In the peacetime, an integrated surveillance and intelligence collection system will be used to monitor the enemy’s political party, military, government, and economic activities. Information security will be obtained through protection procedures and firewalls of the communications and information systems. In wartime, based on mission requirements for combined operations, soft-kill and hard-kill methods will be applied to suppress an enemy’s attack in order to maintain the ROC information superiority and combat effectiveness.

3. Information Warfare Combat Readiness

From the lessons learned of the “Gulf War”, the PRC realizes that only highly agile and effective deployment of command control would win the war. Therefore, PRC has been actively building a global positioning system and fiber optics communications networks in order to obtain combat information superiority. It is said that the PRC has completed over one million kilometers of fiber optics lines and a communications infrastructure, called “Eight Horizontal Grids and Eight Vertical Grids”.⁸ Additionally, the PRC will complement its existing communications infrastructure with satellites, ground mobile receiver stations, and ground-to-air data links. With the technologies obtained from the Western Countries, the PRC can complete the development of satellite, tactical ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Currently, the PRC is indigenously developing “computer viruses”, “logic bombs”, and “EMP weapons”. The PRC calls this: “win the war under high technology conditions”. Based on intelligence reports, since 1997, PRC has included techniques of computer hacker attacks, virus attacks, and information jamming in its military exercises to enhance its readiness for information warfare.

The ROC has also recognized the importance of information in military operations. It has continued information training and office automation. It has built an information infrastructure (such as, around the island fiber optics communications network). A good foundation for the development of information warfare was established. But, most of the ROC defense budget went into the procurement of the advanced fighters and frigates. Also, the export control of key technologies by the U.S. Government made the development of information warfare techniques difficult for the ROC military. Fortunately, the technology bases of the private sectors are quite good. They could be put in place to support the development of information warfare techniques for the ROC military.

4. Defense Budget Support

The PRC has a continued ambition of military take-over of Taiwan. Therefore, it has steadily increased its military readiness with two-digit defense spending increases annually. In 1999, its defense spending is estimated at 12.6 billion U.S. dollars, about 9% of GNP. This allows the PRC devotes large amount of funding to the development of information warfare. Due to the ROC government spending cut and social welfare budget increase, the ROC defense spending is decreasing. There is only a small amount of defense budget allocated for the development of information warfare because the funding is needed to maintain the advanced fighters and the development of tactical ballistic missile system.

5. Private Sector Support

Although the PRC has good progress in the development of information warfare tactics and profiles, but, its development of information technology and techniques are in its initial stage. This is because the information industry of the PRC is primarily OEM. There is no capability in R&D. Contrarily, the information capabilities of the ROC private sector are quite impressive. In an U.S. DOD report on “Taiwan Strait Posture Status”, it stated that the ROC is leading the world in the area of development of anti-virus techniques. The ROC military is utilizing all possible remedies to integrate the synergism of government, industry, academic, and research organization to develop key technologies to facilitate the ROC military in establish the offensive and defensive information warfare capabilities.

6. National Information Warfare

In the development of information warfare, the PRC is promoting the development from the central government. There are different levels of information warfare development, such as, strategy, tactic, combat, and skill. Their determination and effort in implementing and integrating the strategy, combat readiness, and technology are strong. This further exemplifies the intent that the PRC plans to use unconventional and asymmetric methods to fight the future war. The economy of the ROC is prosperous and more relies on information and computers. People do not worry about the national security much. Therefore, the development of information warfare is only limited in the military areas. The information systems of banking, communications, electrical power, and transportation that are vital to the society are vulnerable to enemy attack. This raises a concern of nation security.

In summary, the PRC had an early start in the development of information warfare. Because the PRC is a communist autocratic country, it could use the strength of the whole country to develop information warfare. At this point in time, the PRC leads the ROC in the areas of technology, budget, human resources, policy, and execution of information warfare. However, the scope of information warfare is very large. The information technology is changing very rapidly. Many things may happen. How to promote the development of information warfare is one of the key tasks for the ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND).

IV. FUTURE INFORMATION WARFARE DEVELOPMENT OF ROC AND PRC

The critical time of the competition between the ROC and the PRC in the development of information warfare techniques is in the next five years. According to the information, the PRC has established a Fourth Armed Forces, called the network troop, which is in charge of offensive and defensive information warfare activities.⁹ The PRC also built “an information warfare simulation center”. The center used high technology simulation skills and equipment to simulate the information warfare and its environment. In the research and development of the information warfare techniques, the PRC plans to develop data link, network virus program and related transmission equipment, and no pollution EMP weapon in order to paralyze the command and control system. The PRC actively imports information technologies and equipment, including early warning radar, electronic warfare soft-kill (for example, active airborne jamming equipment), hard-kill (for example, anti-radiation missile) weapon, and communications equipment to improve its information warfare capabilities. It is expected that the PRC may have the following information warfare capabilities by the year of 2005:

1. Use mainframe computer to setup the neural network for joint warfare simulation

2. Develop automated forward area command control system for troop maneuvering in the battlefield

3. Develop tactical date link transmission system for standardization of data transmission

4. Digitize the command and control system for the integration to automatic command control system

5. Mobilize the command control center with satellite receiving /transmission capabilities

6. Use Satellite and AEW aircraft to have joint war fighting command and control capabilities

7. Improve satellite communications techniques to build the satellite navigation capabilities (For example, cruise missile).

8. Build fiber optics communications network to complete the 23 “information freeway” and enhance anti-electromagnetic interference capabilities of the automated command and control system

In order to counter the PRC information warfare threats, in the past years, the ROC military actively promoted an integrated approach of the information warfare planning. There was good progress in the areas of information equipment procurement and the consensus building for national defense. The ROC military is working in the following areas of the information warfare:

1.Build the information security network

a. Improve the ROC military information security function through system monitoring and network node management.

b. Integrate information warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, and Command & Control equipment to achieve the effectiveness of an integrated joint operation.

c. Build the electronic warfare capabilities. The key is to have information from active and passive sensors, to manage battlefield frequency spectrum, to integrate the information, to protect electromagnetic emission, and to avoid the enemy acquire the electronic signals.

2. Build the offensive information warfare capability

Utilize the civil technology bases, establish an “information warfare laboratory”, collect/analyze all kinds of viruses, and implement key techniques to build an effective offensive information warfare weapon. (For example, computer virus, EMP bomb, anti-virus software, network management software)

3. Integrate the C4ISR architecture

Integrate the individual management information systems, combat operation automation systems, and intelligence automation systems into a cohesive Armed Forces combined operations center systems. The C4ISR system shall enhance the Naval operations, Air Force air defense, and combined operations system function. An overall island-wide defense system shall be planned. This shall provide precision, agility, and all aspects command control capabilities. With the acquisition of new radar and data link and the training of doctrine, the ROC military will obtain the information superiority.

4. Implement defense information management system:

Use the C4ISR system as the nucleus to change the defense information management system to support the national policy and strategy planning in peacetime and to support joint operations in wartime. Through organization re-engineering and process improvement, a homogenous integrated service environment for all the ROC Armed Services will be provided.

5. Establish all aspect high quality communications and information environment

An environment of voice, video, data, image, and other information shall be established through network digitization, wire and wireless communications, network management, and simulated network. Platforms with inter- and intra-network shall be developed to support the combat operations and C4ISR command control.

6. Integrate government, industry, academic, and research organization and promote outsourcing

Information technology has its dual use for military and civilian. The technology base of private industry and academic organization is strong. Due to the streamlining of the ROC MND organization and personnel, the ROC military shall follow the directive of the Executive Yuan to outsource its information operations. Through hiring advisors and outsourcing, as well as, integrating the private sector and research organization, the defense information infrastructure and capability will be developed.

7. Promote national level information warfare command

The scope of information warfare is large. It covers political, psychological, economic, technical, and military areas. There are all potential targets of enemy’s information warfare. The Executive Yuan shall be the National Information Warfare Command that integrates the civil affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, financial, education, legal, economic, transportation, and national security agencies. A security safeguard shall be developed to protect the national infrastructure of electrical power, communications, banking, and transportation. Contingent plans also need to be developed. The Ministry of National Defense shall be responsible national defense and promote the development of information warfare in order to safeguard the national security.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The development of information warfare of the ROC and the PRC are all in their initial stage. Each of the two has its own strength. At this point in time, it is still too early to say which one of the two is ahead of the other. One thing for sure is that both the ROC and the PRC will be vigorously promoting the development of information warfare to maintain information superiority. The “Control of the Information” will soon replace the “Control of the Sky” as the top priority of the war fighting between the PRC and the ROC. As paraphrased in the policy report by the Minister Tang of ROC MND, “information warfare capability is the key for military readiness”, if the ROC military does not enhance its information warfare capability, the PRC will pass that of the ROC. This would threaten the ROC national security. Therefore, the development of offensive and defensive capabilities of information warfare techniques becomes the key mission for the ROC military development. As the Internet, communications, and battlefield digitization become more and more important, it is essential to incorporate information warfare into the national level of security policy. Therefore, in concert with the establishment of national information warfare command organization, the ROC military should build the consensus of “People Nation Defense” and step-by-step integrate the resources of the government and private sector to defend the ROC national security jointly.

REFERENCES:

1. Robert H. Allen, “Asymmetric Warfare: Is The Army Ready? http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil/asymmetric_warfare.htm

2. Thomas P. Rona, “Weapon Systems and Information War”, Boeing Aerospace Co., Seattle, WA, 1976

3. Joint Pub 3-13.1 “Command and Control Warfare”, DOD US, February 1996.

4. Joint Pub 3-13 “Information Operations”, DOD US, December 1998.

5. Shen, Wei-Kuang , “ The Type of War and View of Security of the 21st Century”, Mainland China Peking Commentary Monthly Report, February 1998.

6. Chiao, Lang, and Wang, Chian-Hwei, “War on Exceeding the Limits” PLA publication, Peking, February 1999.

7. Tzeng, Chang-Ray, “Digital National Defense, New Thinking In National Defense Strategy Beyond The Century”, National Security and Military Strategy Seminar Dissertations, December 1999.

8. ROC Ministry of National Defense, “Analysis of the Mainland China Information Industry Development”, Mainland China Brief Analysis Summarization, Pub 1206-043, October 1999.

9. Liberty Daily, “Network War, U.S. versus PRC”, November 18, 1999.

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